Like the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in quantum physics, which states that a particle's momentum and position cannot be measured simultaneously, Cultural Relativism has a similar conundrum that could also be referred to as an 'uncertainty principle.' The paradox is this:
1) Cultural relativism contends that any truth is only true according to the cultural paradigm within which it functions.
2) If truth is relative to a given cultural paradigm, then the fact that all truths are necessarily relative must itself be relative to the paradigm of cultural relativism.
3) Therefore, cultural relativism must recognize that its assertion that all truths are relative is itself relative and thus that the universalist assertion that truth can be absolute is true as its own paradigm.
4) Thus it is also true that when universalism asserts that the relativist claim that knowledge and truth are paradigm-dependent is false, that must be a true statement according to both universalism and relativism, in that relativism acknowledges this truth as valid within its paradigm.
The question becomes what basis, if any, relativism maintains for declaring any truth paradigm-dependent, since to make such a claim itself requires a universalistic claim that relativism itself stands above or outside of paradigm-dependence.
In other words, relativism cannot make any claims about paradigm-dependence as a universal qualifier of truth because doing so would undermine the relativistic view of relativism itself.
This fascinating paradox means that social cultural scientists will never be able to go beyond either cultural relativism or universalism in the future. The two are now bound up in 'uncertainty entanglement' in which paradigm-relativism is asserted as universal and paradigm-dependent truths must be asserted in universal terms within their own relative contexts.
To say that creationism's truth that God is responsible for initiating the universe into being is only true by qualifying it as a limited cultural paradigm undermines the universality of paradigm as the basis for any and every truth. I.e. it implies that there is some other truth that is somehow less paradigm-dependent. An atheist physicist, on the other hand, who claims that the existence of God is not a necessary condition for the forces of the universe to generate the big bang, must according to relativism operate under an equally relative paradigm of God-absence. The two paradigms can incorporate one another by, for example, attributing the big bang to God or by describing evolution as a divine process of "going forth and multiplying," but neither paradigmatic approach to knowledge can simultaneously claim its own claims or those of another paradigm to be true in either an absolute or relative sense because all truths are simultaneously universal and paradigm-dependent insofar as paradigms are neither useless analytical constructs nor absolutely independent contexts for knowledge-construction. They are simply patterns of interdependencies and resonances apparent in constellations of knowledge generated in relation with each other.
The great irony of paradigmatic separation is that for two paradigms to be compared or even simply known as separate paradigms, they must be appropriated within a common discourse. Once two or more paradigms are brought together in this way, they become unified if only through the act of differentiating and contrasting them. The gravitational theories of Newton and Einstein are regarded generally as incompatible models of the motion of objects and bodies yet by virtue of them both referring to the possibility of empirical observation and testing, they may also be regarded as both theories within the paradigm of empirical physics. In this sense, are claims made within either paradigm true relative to the paradigm of empirical physics but not within, say, that of Aristotelian philosophies of motion? Or can we even say that there is a paradigm of ultimate universal truth where Aristotle's ideas have failed but Einstein's carry on without sufficient challenge to undermine them?
Maybe what is needed is a philosophy of overlapping paradigms and relative universalities, not to mention universal cultural contextuality as a component of the construction of legitimately universal knowledge. In other words, without culture, there could exist no universal truth because there would be no basis for constructing and refining it and thereby asserting it as universal. I.e. Universal truth claims are the ultimate assertion of culturally relative knowledge. More importantly, their truth value can only be questioned by recognizing and operating within the paradigm of their construction. In other words, noting that a truth claim is relative to some paradigm says nothing about whether it is ultimately true universally or not. What's more, it isn't paradigmatic conditions and specificities that govern the ability to critically question a truth claim but rather open critical reason. In other words, any reasonable critique of a truth claim automatically fits within the paradigm of that claim simply by virtue of the fact it can be construed as a reasonable critique or question. If something makes sense in the context of something else, how can it be of a different paradigm?
